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Subprime Lending in the Primary
and Secondary Markets
Anthony Pennington-Cross*

Abstract
This article provides an exploratory analysis of the role of subprime lending through an examination of
the spatial distribution of Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-eligible home purchase loans in the
primary and secondary mortgage markets. Loan originations are aggregated to the metropolitan statistical area level to examine the proportion of the market served by FHA, prime, and subprime lenders.
The article then examines whether subprime lenders hold their loans in portfolio or sell them to private
conduits.
Primary market results indicate that subprime lenders are more active in cities with worse economic
risk characteristics. Secondary market results indicate that although subprime lenders sell most loans,
they are more likely to hold loans in portfolio when economic risks are improving in historically highrisk locations. Finally, when more loans are originated in underserved census tracts, subprime lenders
are much more likely to hold loans in portfolio.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Primary mortgage market; Secondary mortgage market; Sub-

prime mortgage market

Introduction
Borrowers who use subprime lending face a tiered pricing schedule and can pay interest rates
400 basis points higher than in the prime market. Lending standards also are enforced in a
flexible manner, and low-documentation lending programs such as "No Income Verification"
or "No Ratio" are available for borrowers with good credit history and a strong asset base
(Steinbach 1998).
After loan origination, the servicing of current and seriously delinquent loans tends to be less
automated and more labor intensive in the subprime market. This has led, at least in part, to
estimates that the cost of servicing is four times higher for subprime loans (Kogler 1997).
Most of the unique factors associated with subprime lending relate to the price the borrower
pays and the costs of originating and servicing the loans. Another factor is that the secondary
market treats subprime loans differently than prime loans. For instance, very few subprime
mortgages are held in portfolio by the financial institutions that originate the loans. Most
loans are sold as whole loans to private investors or are securitized as asset-backed securities
* Anthony Pennington-Cross is an Economist at the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
The author was the Director of Research at the Mortgage Bankers Association of America Research Institute for
Housing America when this article was submitted. The views expressed in this research are those of the author and
do not represent policies or positions of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America Research Institute for Housing America, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, or other officers, agencies, or instrumentalities of
the U.S. government.
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(ABS). This contrasts with prime loans, which typically are securitized as mortgage-backed
securities (MBS).l
Although using a subprime lender to purchase a home or refinance an existing mortgage may
be the most expensive option available to the borrower, the sub prime market has been growing dramatically. For instance, between 1993 and 1998, the subprime market as a whole grew
by more than 1,400 percent, from approximately 70,000 to 10,540,000 loans (Joint Center for
Housing Studies of Harvard University 2000). In contrast, the whole market grew less than
22 percent. On average, subprime home purchase loans-which made up approximately 23
percent of all sub prime loans-grew 900 percent during the same period. Therefore, although
the refinance segment of the subprime market is larger than the home purchase segment,
subprime lending has made strong inroads in the home purchase market. In fact, sub prime
purchases constituted more than 5 percent of the purchase market by 1998. 2
The effect of local risk factors on the fraction of the market that uses sub prime lending is
examined in this article, as is the decision of sub prime lenders to hold loans in portfolio or sell
them to private conduits. This article extends previous work by Ambrose and PenningtonCross (2000) that examined similar relationships for prime mortgages.
The basic premise of the first part of the analysis is that in areas with more risk, more borrowers are likely to use subprime mortgage financing because of differences in underwriting
standards and the shape of the risk distribution. Risks vary by location and over time. Using
local economic conditions as a proxy for risk, the relationships between these indicators and
the market shares of prime, Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and sub prime lending in
more than 300 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) are examined.
The second part of the analysis examines what a lender does after the sub prime loan is originated. A sub prime lender can retain the mortgage in portfolio or sell the mortgage to a private conduit. Two primary questions are addressed. First, do subprime originators change
their selling/retaining behavior as local economic conditions change? Second, if behavior does
change, what patterns are visible, and what might the results mean?
This article examines the home purchase segment of the sub prime market. It focuses only on
loans that meet FHA loan limits to highlight results on the relationships between prime, subprime, and FHA lending. Although data limitations need to temper any conclusions drawn,
results show that subprime lending in the primary and secondary mortgage markets IS
responsive to local economic conditions and clearly differentiated from prime lending.
I ABS and MBS are very similar in that both are securities created from cash flow generated from loans that are
backed by assets such as a home or car. In general, although mortgages are backed by an asset (real estate), they are
securitized in the MBS market. However, at least traditionally, all home equity lines of credit and fixed-term loans,
which tend to make up a large share of subprime loans, are securitized in the ABS market.

2 All data tabulations are taken from the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University's The State of the
Nation's Housing 2000 report, table A-II. This report obtains its data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) data sets, which do not include manufactured housing. Subprime lending is defined as loans made by subprime specialists identified by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and based on industry
sources, denial rates, refinance share, and lender name. These fii,'Ures may overstate the growth in subprime lending as a result of (1) changes in the way entities (especially mortgage bankers) report to HMDA, and (2) increasing
acquisitions of subprime lenders by depositories transforming them into mortgage banking subsidiaries.
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The following sections of this article provide background and motivation for the empirical
approach, detail the data sources and definitions of variables, discuss the results, and, lastly,
provide a concluding discussion.

Background and Motivation
The selection of mortgage type has been studied extensively in the primary mortgage market.
For example, Brueckner and Follain (1988), Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995), Capone and Cunningham (1992), Phillips and VanderHoff (1994), and Tucker (1989) examined the choice
between adjustable-rate and fixed-rate mortgages. Similarly, Dhillon, Shilling, and Sirmans
(1990) studied the choice between 15-year and 30-year fixed-rate mortgage contracts. Other
studies have examined the choice between conventional and government-insured mortgages
using microdata on individual households (Gabriel and Rosenthal 1991; Goodman and
Nichols 1997; Hendershott, LaFayette, and Haurin 1997; Linneman and Wachter 1989;
Pennington-Cross and Nichols 2000). Loan products offered by subprime lenders provide
more alternatives for borrowers and should be included as one possible outcome.
Lenders use standards (payment-to-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios, and credit history) to
limit credit and prepayment risks. Because FHA lending standards are more lenient than
prime lending standards, wealth- and income-constrained borrowers are more likely to use
FHA mortgage financing. Sub prime financing is even less strict than FHA financing with
respect to maximum front-end and back-end payment-to-income ratios. Credit history also
plays a large role in the qualification process. Although subprime lenders allow 60 percent
debt ratios and even current bankruptcies, they also may require a 30 percent down payment
to mitigate the perceived risks of high debt ratios and poor credit history. In total, the mortgage market has the ability to provide mortgages to a wide range of borrowers, as lenders use
a variety of approaches to compensate for weaknesses of an application. This flexibility is
most visible in subprime lending, where credit scores and down payments can compensate for
unverifiable income and high debt ratios. 3
Assuming borrowers are utility maximizing, they will choose the lowest cost mortgage available. Prime loans are the least costly, FHA loans are more costly, and subprime loans are the
most costly; therefore, rational borrowers should prefer prime mortgages to FHA mortgages
and FHA mortgages to subprime mortgages. Let Si represent the proportion of FHA-eligible
borrowers in MSA i that select a sub prime mortgage, such that

(1)
where Xi is a matrix of variables that captures variation in local economic risk and demographic
factors, and 0 p ' (")/, and (-), are prime, FHA, and subprime underwriting standards, respectively.
Assuming that prime underwriting standards are tighter than FHA underwriting standards,

The characteristics of the subprime lending environment are derived from Weicher (1997), Steinbach (1998),
and the Sub-Prime Funding Corporation Underwriting Manual, downloaded from the Web site
<http://www.allstatecapital.com/manuaI2.html> on 3/17/98.

3
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and FHA standards are tighter than subprime standards (e, > @/ > (H»), then an increase in
local economic risk results in fewer borrowers meeting prime lending standards and an
increase in subprime originations (asj a\; > 0). The effect on FHA market share is more
ambiguous and depends on the shape ofthe risk distribution. Because the majority of the mortgage market uses prime financing, it is likely that an increase in risk will increase FHA's market share. This article examines the prime/FHNsubprime outcome as a multinomial logit
model that represents a cross-sectional analysis at the MSA level of the percent of FHA-eligible mortgages originated as prime, FHA, and subprime loans.
The second part of the analysis focuses on the disposition of FHA-eligible subprime loans in
the secondary market. Although the government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac) dominate the secondary market for prime loans, this article assumes that they
did not purchase subprime loans during this period. Rather, the outlets in the secondary
market for subprime loans have been private conduits that securitize and provide credit
enhancements.
Previous analysis of the secondary market is very limited. Canner and Gabriel (1992) examined the role oflender specialization in the secondary markets, whereas Hendershott and Villani (1980) examined the impact of the secondary market on the cost of mortgage lending.
Benjamin, Heuson, and Sirmans (1997) showed that for adjustable-rate loans, lenders who
hold loans in portfolio are sensitive to factors that affect the long-term costs and benefits. Presumably this concern is dominated by the probability of the loan terminating through default
or prepayment. Lenders who typically sell loans are more affected by the short-term secondary market commitment rates.
Both the private conduit and the originator know all the standard risk indicators (credit history, down payment, and payment-to-income ratios) associated with a mortgage or a group of
mortgages. Given this information, the private conduit determines a price based on its own
assessment of the probability of termination and loss severity. The lower the lender's assessment of risk relative to the private conduit's assessment of risk, the more likely the lender
will hold the loan in portfolio. In general, if the internal rate of return is greater than the
securitization rate of return (guaranteed payment streams less fees), the lender should hold
the mortgage in portfolio (Gilkeson, Jacob, and Smith 1994).
Van Order (2001) has shown that secondary market institutions are likely to enter the mortgage market in individual risk segments and are attracted to those segments with the least
internal variation in risk and the largest density of supply (volume of mortgages originated
that can be securitized). This description indicates that the secondary market will not be successful in the subprime market, because the density of supply is relatively small, and the performance of subprime mortgages varies dramatically (Mortgage Information Corporation
[MIC] 2000).
Notwithstanding this part of the theory, most subprime loans are sold to private conduits in
the secondary market. This is because the cost of holding subprime loans in portfolio is very
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high.4 First, regulatory agencies typically require that depositories hold more capital for subprime mortgages than for prime mortgages; and second, the chances of large and unexpected
losses are higher. For instance, MIC has estimated that subprime default rates can exceed
20 times the default rate for prime loans.
Although most subprime mortgages are sold into the secondary market rather than retained
in portfolio, the subprime market is more likely to suffer from informational asymmetries
than the prime market. These asymmetries are driven by the lack of homogeneity of subprime
loans and the lack of sophisticated evaluation models being used by originators, making it
more likely that information is lost as the mortgage moves from originator to the private conduit in the secondary market.
Lenders can capitalize on their asymmetric information advantage with respect to borrower
credit quality and local economic conditions by trying to sell the higher risk loans and retain
the lower risk loans in portfolio. Private conduits can try to control the potential adverse
selection problem, or "lemons" problem, resulting from the information asymmetries between the lender and the securitizer by manipulating the lender's guaranteed rate of return
or by including a right of recourse against lenders who securitize an excessive number ofloans
that default (Passmore and Sparks 1996).
In addition, even if both the originator and the private conduit have the same information set,
there is no guarantee that they will estimate the same profitability for a pool of loans. If private conduits underestimate, relative to the originators, the effect oflocal economic factors on
termination rates, lenders can try to sell more loans when local conditions are riskier and hold
more loans in portfolio when local conditions are less risky.
This article tests for a relationship between the rate at which subprime lenders hold loans in
portfolio and local economic conditions. To model the subprime lender's decision to securitize,
let Mi be the proportion of subprime FHA-eligible mortgages in MSA i that are retained in
portfolio. Assume that

(2)
where 8(X) represents the probability of borrower default dependent on local economic risk
characteristics (X) such that a8(x)/ax > 0, and u is the unobserved cost associated with securitization. If lenders are effective in s~lling lemons to the secondary market, a higher proportion of loans should be securitized in areas with greater economic risk (aMJ aXI < 0).
However, if the secondary market has effective controls (such as recourse against lenders)
that mitigate the lemons problem, securitization activity will not vary, or perhaps will decline,
in areas with higher economic risk (aMJ aXI ~ 0). One other potential explanation for any
pattern observed is that originators believe that local risk factors affect profitability differently than private conduits believe they do. 5
Van Order (2001) also discusses the importance of the cost of holding a loan in portfolio as another determinant of
secondary market viability.

4

This (an arbitrage position) may not be sustainable in the long run; it is difficult at this point to know the true
behavior of subprime mortgages until they have been traded on the open market for a longer period of time.

5
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Data
A variety of information sources were used, including extracts from the FHA F-42 loan
files and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database. To correct for potential
underreporting in HMDA (Bunce and Scheessele 1996), FHA loans were identified from the
F-42 database. 6 Using these sources, the total number of FHA-eligible mortgages originated
was calculated for 1995 and 1996 for 306 MSAs that had economic data available from Standard & Poor's DR!. FHA eligible refers to all mortgages with loan amounts under the FHA
loan limit as defined by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) by
county. Because the study focuses on FHA, conventional, and subprime lending in metropolitan areas, it excludes all u.s. Department of Veterans Mfairs and Rural Housing Service
loam,.
To separate the subprime and prime conventional loans, a list of sub prime lenders that report
to HMDA, created in 1998 by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research, was used.
The list has been updated every year, growing from 129 lenders to more than 200 by the year
2000. This list was created from trade publications and therefore may not include all subprime lenders who report to HMDA. In addition, not all subprime lenders report to HMDA.
The probability of reporting to HMDA is likely to increase with lender size. Further, if brokers originate more subprime purchase-money mortgages, and those loans are not reported
to HMDA, the sampled loans may be atypical. Measurement error may include some conventionalloans categorized as prime that actually may be sub prime and some loans categorized
as subprime that may be prime loans. 7
These data sources distinguish between prime, FHA, and subprime mortgages to determine
the final disposition of the subprime mortgages, either retained in portfolio or sold to a
private conduit. s The percentage of FHA-eligible loans insured by FHA was calculated for a
See the third quarter 1997 US. Housing Market Conditions published by the Office of Policy Development and
Research, HUD.

6

Although it is difficult to compare shares of loan numbers with dollar-value shares, HMDA estimates of subprime
market share, which are based on the number of loans, are always less than the estimates created by industry analysts at Inside Mortgage Finance (2001), which are based on the dollar value of loans. Inside Mortgage Finance
reports shares as 10.2 and 12.3 percent for 1995 and 1996, respectively, whereas HMDA reports 3.3 and 4.2 percent.
Although important information (such as prepayment penalties, credit scores, down payments, and contract interest rates) is not available to compare data used in this study with other potential data sources, it is clear that the
HMDA approach does not include all subprime loans. For instance, for 1995 the Inside Mortgage Finance estimate
of subprime market share, using the dollar value of loans, is almost 7 percentage points higher than HMDA estimates
for 1995. By 1998 this spread decreased to just over one point. This may indicate changing reporting in HMDA,
changing methodology by Inside Mortgage Finance, or the changing market structure of subprime lending. In contrast to the approach used in this article, it is preferable to use the terms of a mortgage (e.g., interest rate, fees, and
prepayment penalties) to identify subprime loans.
7

Mortgages are classified as either held in portfolio or sold to a private conduit based on the types of institutions originating and (if sold) buying the loan. If the originator is a bank, thrift, or credit union, the loan is classified as held
in portfolio if it is not sold or if the loan is sold to a parent that is either a bank, thrift, or credit union. All other sold
loans are considered out of portfolio and sold. If the originator is a mortgage bank (reporting to HUD for HMDA data
collection) that is not a subsidiary of a bank, thrift, or credit union, all loans sold are considered out of portfolio and
sold. In contrast, if the parent of the mortgage bank is a bank, thrift, or credit union, loans sold to the parent are
classified as held in portfolio. Note that it is possible that the parent depository could act as an aggregator for the
subsidiary, but depositories may try to avoid direct ownership of subprime loans to avoid additional regulatory
requirements (higher reserve requirements and increased regulatory scrutiny).

8
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given MSA as the number of FHA originations divided by the total number of FHA-eligible
loans in that MSA. Similarly, the percentage of FHA-eligible mortgages originated as prime
or subprime loans was calculated by dividing the number of FHA-eligible prime or subprime
originations by the total number of FHA-eligible loans in that MSA. Reflecting the dominance
of prime lenders in terms of price and service, the calculations show that, on average, prime
originations account for 79 percent of the FHA-eligible market. Table 1 provides a list of the
variables used in the analysis as well as the descriptive statistics.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for 1995 and 1996
Description

Source

Variable

Dependent:
Percent of loans originated as
prime loans in t
Percent of loans originated as
FHA loans in t
Percent of loans originated as
subprime loans in t

GSE PUDB,
HUD/F-42,
HMDA
GSE PUDB,
HUD/F-42,
HMDA
GSE PUDB,
HUD/F-42,
HMDA

SD

Min

Max

Obs

Percent of FHA-Eligible Originations

Prime,

79.05

11.21

43.14

99.53

612

FIL\

19.83

11.10

0.38

55.64

612

Subprime,

1.13

1.39

0.00

20.83

612

Dependent:
Percent of subprime loans sold to
private conduit in t
Percent of subprime loans held in
portfolio in t

Sjt'

Mean

Mit>

Final Disposition of Subprime Loans

HMDA

Soldt

93.36

11.75

0.00

100.00

589

HMDA

Portfolio,

6.64

11.75

0.00

100.00

589

Economic Risk
One-year percent change in house
prices from t-1 to t
One-year change in the
unemployment rate from t-1 to t

Freddie
Mac
DRI

SD of percent change in house
price for previous 10 years in t

Freddie
Mac

Six-year average of the
unemployment rate in t

BLS

4.33

2.62

-7.11

12.58

612

Change in
-0.20
unemployment
ratet
Variance of
2.18
house price
growth,
Unemployment 5.96
rate,

0.93

-6.00

8.40

612

1.21

0.28

10.00

612

2.69

1.78

22.60

612

12.27

0.00

74.24

612

14.51

0.79

94.34

612

15.73

2.90

77.10

612

House price
growtht

Demographic
Percent of loans made in
underserved census tracts
in t-1
Percent of loan applications by
minorities in t-1
Gini coefficient for blacks in 1990

GSE PUDB, Underserved'_l 27.17
HUD/F-42,
HMDA
GSE PUDB, MinoritY'_l
16.73
HUD/F-42,
HMDA
Census
Segregation, 30.34

Journal of Housing Research

38

Anthony Pennington-Cross

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for 1995 and 1996 (continued)
Description

Source

Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Obs

Location
High-cost location-median house
prices greater than 75 percent
of the Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae
conforming loan limit
Medium-cost location-median
house prices between 75 and
38 percent of the Freddie Mac/
Fannie Mae conforming
loan limit
Vermont, Maine, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
New Hampshire
Alaska, Idaho, Oregon,
Washington
Utah, Colorado, South Dakota,
Wyoming, Montana, North
Dakota
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin
New York, New Jersey

HUD

High cost,

0.700

0.460

0

1

612

HUD

Medium cost,

0.140

0.350

0

1

612

HUD

New
England,

0.036

0.186

0

1

612

HUD

Northwest,

0.046

0.209

0

1

612

HUD

Mountain,

0.055

0.228

0

1

612

HUD

Midwest,

0.180

0.384

0

1

612

HUD

0.069

0.253

0

1

612

Nevada, California, Arizona,
Hawaii
Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas,
New Mexico, Louisiana
Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Tennessee, South
Carolina, Alabama, Puerto
Rico, North Carolina
Delaware, West Virginia, District
of Columbia, Virginia,
Maryland, Pennsylvania

HUD

New York/
New JerseYt
Pacific,

0.101

0.302

0

1

612

HUD

Southwestt

0.150

0.358

0

1

612

HUD
HUD

Great Plains,
Southeast,

0.056
0.212

0.230
0.409

0
0

1
1

612
612

HUD

Middle
Atlantict

0.098

0.298

0

1

612

Notes: ABA, American Bankers Association; BLS, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Census, U.S. Bureau of the Census;
DRI, Standard & Poor's DR!; GSE PUDB, government-sponsored enterprise public-use database; Max, maximum;
Min, minimum; MBA, Mortgage Bankers Association of America; Obs, observations; SD, standard deviation.

Within the subset of subprime originations, the share of mortgages lenders held in portfolio
was calculated for each MSA by dividing the number of loans held in portfolio in the MSA by
the total number of FHA-eligible sub prime originations in that MSA. The percentage of loans
in each MSA sold to private conduits was calculated similarly. Given the elevated risks of termination for subprime loans, it is not surprising that 93 percent of the FHA-eligible sub prime
mortgages were sold. As indicated by the large standard deviations in table 1, there is substantial variation in loan dispositions by MSA.
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To assess the risk associated with each MSA, measures of economic and demographic characteristics are included. Economic characteristics include the performance of the housing market and the labor market. Demographic characteristics include racial indicators, the presence
of under served households (as defined by HUD), and the extent of racial segregation.

Economic Risk
The movement of house prices can have a strong effect on credit risk, default probabilities,
loss severity, and the profitability of loans. 9 The yearly percentage change in local house prices
and the standard deviation of change in house prices over the past 10 years are included to
measure whether house prices moved up or down and whether they were stable or volatile. If
prime lenders are more active in lower risk areas or high-growth areas, the percentage change
in house prices should be positively associated with prime market shares and negatively associated with FHA and subprime shares. The standard deviation in house prices may indicate
greater risk to lenders; therefore, FHA and subprime market shares should be higher as
volatility increases.
To measure local labor market conditions, changes in local employment, as measured by the
yearly change in the local unemployment rate and the average unemployment rate for each
MSA over the past six years, are included. Again, it is expected that if unemployment
increases or is historically high, it will be more likely that homeowners will have trouble making timely payments on outstanding debt and, as a result, will be considered higher risk
borrowers.
When considering the disposition of subprime mortgages after their origination, it is useful to
group the economic risk proxies into short-run changes and long-run characteristics. For
instance, the change in house prices and the change in the unemployment rate represent
short-run events, whereas the stability of house prices and the average unemployment rate
are determined over a longer historical period. If information asymmetries exist as originators of subprime loans sell loans to private conduits, it may be easier to take advantage of
short-run events rather than historical trends. In addition, different participants in the secondary market may value risks associated directly with the housing market differently than
risks associated with the labor market. Lastly, originators that sell most of their loans should
be more concerned with short-run changes in conditions (warehousing risk) than entities that
hold the long-term risk of termination (Benjamin, Heuson, and Sirmans 1997).

Demographics
Demographic factors such as race, spatial segregation, and living in traditionally underserved locations are not measures of risk but have been included in econometric models on
the selection of FHA insurance in the mortgage market (for example, Gabriel and Rosenthal

See Capozza, Kazarian, and Thomson (1997), Deng and Calhoun (1997), and Ambrose and Capone (1998). Other
components of economic risk, including prepayment risk, cannot be addressed with the data used in this article.

9
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1991, and Pennington-Cross and Nichols 2000). If the racial/ethnic characteristics of home
buyers are uncorrelated with missing variables, there should be no relationship between
race/ethnicity and mortgage type. Gabriel and Rosenthal (1991) and Ambrose and
Pennington-Cross (2000) found that minorities are more likely to use FHA than conventional financing. In contrast, Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000) showed that after including detailed credit history in addition to other measures of lending standards,
Mrican-American households actually were less likely than white households to use FHA
financing. Because the analysis in this article does not include credit history, it is expected
that results will suggest that minority households are more likely to use FHA-insured
financing and subprime lending.
Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000) and Ambrose and Pennington-Cross (2000) have shown
that whether or not credit history is included, home buyers use FHA financing more often in
underserved locations, as defined by HUD. If this is one way that lenders adjust behavior to
meet Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements, the same results might hold for
sub prime lending.
A measure of local segregation is included to determine whether market shares vary depending on the level of racial segregation. Segregation was measured by the spatial distribution of
different groups across the local region and was derived using census data from 1990 from the
Lorenz curve with values between 0 and 100, with 100 indicating maximum segregation
(Massey and Denton 1988). This typically is referred to as the Gini coefficient.
Finally, indicators of whether the MSA is high-, medium-, or low-cost are included. Because

of the way FHA sets loan limits, FHA-eligible borrowers in the more expensive areas cover a
smaller fraction of the market. io The borrowers examined in this article represent those in
the cheapest part of the market in high-cost areas. Therefore, in high-cost areas borrowers
would tend to have more difficulty amassing a down payment or meeting other financial obligations, and they may use FHA and subprime lending more frequently. In addition, variables
to control for regional (HUD-defined regions of the United States) and time (a 1995 indicator) effects are included.
When considering the demographic variables and their role in the final disposition of subprime loans, the focus of the analysis shifts to the costs and benefits of holding loans in portfolio versus selling them into the secondary market. An institution that needs to increase its
CRA-eligible loan count may decide to hold more of these loans in portfolio to get credit
beyond origination. It also may be more difficult to make homogeneous or large enough pools
with loans from underserved locations for aggregation. l l Ambrose and Pennington-Cross
(2000) found that prime loans are more likely to be held in portfolio in areas with more
underserved households. If borrowers in underserved census tracts are more likely to be

10 FHA loan limits are capped at the same fixed nominal dollar amount for all high-cost metropolitan areas. In contrast, loan limits vary depending on house prices in medium-cost metropolitan areas.

11 eRA-eligible loans are not double counted, however. For instance, loans that are counted because they are originated do not get counted again if securities from these same loans are purchased by the same lender.
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eRA eligible, it is likely that depository institutions, or subprime lenders who wish to merge
with depository institutions, may hold more loans in portfolio to improve their marketability. Lastly, the growth of subprime lending is a relatively new phenomenon and its acceptance (in both the primary and secondary markets) is unlikely to be uniform in different
locations or in different segments of the mortgage market.
Results
The market shares were calculated for 306 MSAs for 4,584,3511995 and 1996 loans. Loan disposition of sub prime lending was calculated for 45,359 loans from 1995 and 1996 in 294
MSAs. The logistic estimation technique weights each observation (market share) by the
number of loans in each MSA. For large samples such as the primary market estimates, this
technique may lead to artificially low standard error estimates (Greene 1990). Sensitivity
analysis using graphical displays and standardized marginal effects were used to identify the
economic importance of individual factors.

Primary Market
Table 2 provides the results of the multinomial logit estimation, and table 3 presents the
standardized marginal effects evaluated at the mean. The model predicts that the prime
market share (evaluated at the data means) is 78 percent, the FHA market share is 21 percent, and the sub prime market share is 1 percent. This compares with the actual mean market shares of 79 percent, 20 percent, and 1 percent for prime, FHA, and subprime lending,
respectively. The results show that prime lending is more likely in locations with less economic risk, and FHA and subprime lending are more active when local risks are higher. No
single factor implies that sub prime lending can become a substantial proportion of any local
mortgage market.

Economic Risk. If the growth in house price increases one standard deviation from the mean
of 4.3 percent, then prime, FHA, and subprime market shares change from their means by 2,
-7, and 2 percent, respectively.12 The market share of subprime lending is most sensitive to
changes in the unemployment rate. If the change in the unemployment rate is moved from
the mean of -0.2 percent to 0.73 (one standard deviation increase), the subprime market
share increases 5 percent. In comparison, the magnitude of the same effect on prime and FHA
market shares is negligible (less than 0.1 percent). In locations where the unemployment rate
has been historically high, there tends to be more subprime lending and slightly less FHAinsured lending. In summary, subprime lending is most prevalent in locations with weak labor
market conditions and declining house prices. FHA insurance is most active in locations with
very poor housing market conditions-declining and volatile house prices.

12 Note that the percent change is defined as a percent increase, not a percentage point increase. For example, 0.05,
or 5 percent, indicates that a market share of 30 percent would increase to 31.5 percent = 30 X 1.05.
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Table 2. Multinomial Logit Model of Mortgage Choice
FHA
Variable
Constant
House price growtht
Change in unemployment ratet
Variance of house price growtht
Unemployment ratet
U nderservedt_ 1
MinoritYt_1
Segregation t
Medium costt
High costt
Northwestt
Midwestt
New York/New Jersey!
Pacifict
Southwestt
Great Plainst
Southeastt
New Englandt
Middle Atlantict
1995
Log of likelihood

Parameter

-0.75
-3.43
0.41
5.18
-0.71
-1.65
0.71
0.00
0.34
0.22
-0.75
-0.55
-1.04
-0.21
0.06
-0.29
-0.30
-1.62
-0.04
-0.11
-2,557,716

t-statistic
-57.1
-57.8
2.0
49.4
-9.6
-81.5
45.4
-12.6
41.2
23.0
-93.5
-76.6
-124.4
-30.8
8.0
-33.8
-44.0
-152.5
-5.1
-37.7

Subprime
Parameter

-4.05
-1.47
10.98
-4.43
1.63
-0.86
0.38
0.00
-0.33
-0.52
0.22
-0.02
0.18
0.86
0.86
0.04
0.55
0.08
0.00
-0.33

t-statistic

-77.6
-6.3
16.0
-9.7
6.1
-11.0
6.3
5.3
-12.6
-16.2
5.7
-0.5
4.8
25.3
23.5
0.8
15.6
1.8
0.0
-28.1

Note: The excluded category is the market share of prime mortgages. Therefore, coefficients are to be interpreted as
increasing or decreasing the market share of the column choice relative to prime. Because it is difficult to interpret
these coefficients, see the standardized marginal effects in table 3 for an economic interpretation of the results.

Demographic Characteristics. There is some limited evidence that HUD affordable housing
goals may increase the presence of prime lending instead of subprime lending in underserved
census tracts. In support of the positions taken by some housing advocates and government
agencies (for example, the Woodstock Institute and HUD), the presence of subprime lending is
higher in locations that experience more racial isolation. One standard deviation increase in
the segregation index leads to a 4 percent increase in the subprime market share but has no
effect on prime lending.
As shown in table 3, borrowers located in the least expensive MSAs are more than one-third
less likely to use subprime lending than borrowers in medium- and high-cost locations. 13 In
addition, FHA lending is more likely to be used in medium- and high-cost locations. This is
logical, because FHA's insurance program focuses on low down payments, which may be a
more important factor in high-cost locations.

13 In table 3, for the reported dummy variables (0,1 indicators, which includes all variables after Segregation), standardized marginal effects show the percent change in the probability of the outcome if the dummy variable is increased
from 0 to 1 and all other variables are evaluated at their means.
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Table 3. Standardized Multinomial Logit Model Marginal Effects
Variable

Prime

FHA

Subprime

House price growth t
Change in unemployment rate t
Variance of house price growtht
Unemployment rate,
U nderservedt_ 1
MinoritYt_l
Segregationt
Medium costt
High costf
Northwest t
Midwestf
New York/New JerseYt
Pacifict
Southwestf
Great Plains,
Southeast!
New Englandt
Middle Atlantict
1995

0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.04
-0.02
0.00
-0.06
-0.04
0.12
0.11
0.16
0.03
-0.02
0.05
0.05
0.21
0.01
0.03

-0.07
0.00
0.05
-0.02
-0.15
0.08
-0.02
0.32
0.19
-0.47
-0.36
-0.59
-0.17
0.04
-0.21
-0.22
-0.76
-0.03
-0.08

-0.02
0.11
-0.06
0.05
-0.06
0.03
0.04
-0.33
-0.43
0.39
0.08
0.40
1.44
1.31
0.09
0.82
0.31
0.01
-0.26

Note: Standardized marginal effects for continuous variables are defined as the percent change in the fraction of
loans using prime, FHA, or subprime lending in response to one standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable. For dummy variables, which include all variables after Segregation in the table, standardized marginal effects
indicate the percent change in the dependent variable as the explanatory variable is increased from 0 to 1. In all cases
all other variables are evaluated at their means. The percent change is defined as a percent increase, not a percentage point increase. For example, 0.05 indicates that a market share of 30 percent would increase to 31.5 percent =
30 X 1.05.

Looking at variations across regions, prime market share is highest in New England, whereas
FHA and subprime market shares are highest in the Southwest. The magnitude of the marginal effects indicates that there is a substantial amount of regional variation not explained
by the model, which requires further study.

Subprime Loan Disposition
This section examines the disposition of FHA-eligible subprime mortgages in the secondary
market. Loans are either held in portfolio or sold to a private conduit. The results are presented in tables 4 and 5. Table 4 provides the coefficient estimates and t-statistics, and table 5
provides the standardized marginal effects. These marginal effects represent the percent
change, not the percentage point change, in the fraction of loans that sub prime lenders hold
in portfolio in response to an increase of one standard deviation in the explanatory variable
from its mean value. For dummy variables, which include all variables after Minority in the
table, the percent change is in response to an increase of the explanatory dummy from 0 to 1,
whereas all other variables are evaluated at their means.
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Table 4. Logit Model of Subprime Loan Disposition
Contemporaneous
Information
Variable
Constant
House price growtht
House price growtht_l
Change in unemployment rate t
Change in unemployment rate t_l
Variance of house price growth,
Unemployment ratet
U nderservedt_ l
MinoritYt_1
Segregation,
Medium costt
High cost,
Northwest t
Midwestt
New York/New JerseYt
Pacifict
Southwestt
Great Plainst
Southeast,
New Englandt
Middle Atlantic,
1995
Log of likelihood

Contemporaneous and Lagged
Information

Parameter

t-statistic

Parameter

t-statistic

-3.83
1.77

-17.82
2.08

-0.11

-5.04

0.12
0.04
3.97
-1.49
0.02
-1.30
-1.44
0.20
0.57
-0.64
0.96
-0.12
0.41
0.15
1.60

7.02
4.49
14.25
-6.00
12.10
-17.41
-13.94
1.09
3.31
-3.25
5.90
-0.66
2.09
0.87
8.18

-2.40
8.63
-9.00
0.01
-0.32
0.10
0.03
4.36
-1.49
0.02
-1.43
-1.96
-0.08
0.01
-1.48
-0.13
-1.10
-0.44
-0.68
1.07

-10.22
8.39
-14.39
0.48
-9.56
5.84
3.54
14.66
-5.74
12.23
-19.07
-18.03
-0.41
0.04
-7.15
-0.74
-5.90
-2.17
-3.82
5.22

-0.08

-0.44

-0.91

-4.66

-0.50
-11,255

-10.20

-1.23
-11,085

-18.27

Note: Coefficient estimates are interpreted as increasing or decreasing the fraction of loans that the lender holds in
portfolio. See table 5 for economic interpretation.

Table 5 shows that for the contemporaneous information results (the first column), all of the
economic and demographic variables are significant at the 5 percent level. In general, as local
economic risks deteriorate, subprime lenders are contemporaneously more likely to sell loans
and less likely to hold loans in portfolio. However, when local economic conditions are historically poor, subprime lenders are more likely to hold loans in portfolio. These potentially contradictory results imply either that subprime lenders and private conduits must have
different views of the effects of local economic conditions on the profitability of mortgages, or
that informational asymmetries are affecting the retain/sell decision.
One potential explanation is that long-term or historical indicators of risk are likely to be
known by both local originators and "arm's-length" participants in the secondary market. In
contrast, changes in local economic conditions are more likely to be known locally (by the originating institution) first, and only later become known by arm's-length private conduits as
the information disseminates. Therefore, the potential for information asymmetries is greatest for changes in risk conditions. The results support this assertion of asymmetric information and potential adverse selection by finding that subprime originators sell more loans when
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Table 5. Standardized Marginal Effects of Loan Disposition
Variable
House price growth,
House price growth'~l
Change in unemployment rate,
Change in unemployment rate'~l
Variance of house price growtht
Unemployment rate,
U nderserved,~ 1
MinoritY'~l

Segregation,
Medium cost,
High cost,
Northwest,
Midwest,
New York/New Jersey,
Pacific,
Southwestt
Great Plains,
Southeastt
New England,
Middle Atlantic,
1995

Contemporaneous Information,
Marginal Effect
0.05
-0.10
0.16
0.12
0.64
-0.20
0.35
-0.73
-0.76
0.22
0.76
-0.47
1.61
-0.11
0.50
0.16
3.96
-0.08
-0040

Contemporaneous and Lagged
Information, Marginal Effect
0.25
-0.40
0.01
-0.28
0.13
0.10
0.72
-0.20
0.36
-0.76
-0.86
-0.07
0.01
-0.77
-0.12
-0.67
-0.35
-0.49
1.91
-0.60
-0.71

Note: Standardized marginal effects for continuous variables are defined as the percent change in the fraction of

loans held in portfolio in response to one standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable. For dummy variables, which include all variables after Segregation in the table, standardized marginal effects indicate the percent
change in the dependent variable as the explanatory variable is increased from 0 to 1. All other variables are evaluated at their means. The percent change is defined as a percent increase, not a percentage point increase. For example, 0.05 indicates that a retention rate of 30 percent would increase to 31.5 percent = 30 X 1.05.

risks increase and hold onto more loans (whether in pipeline or in portfolio) in locations historically known for high-risk conditions. 14
To further test this result, the second columns of tables 4 and 5 report the contemporaneous
change in house prices and unemployment rates and the previous year's change in house
prices and unemployment rates. The persistence of house prices and unemployment rates
requires that this set of results be viewed with caution. The results support the hypothesis
that information asymmetries are an important part of the subprime secondary market. For
instance, if house prices increase one standard deviation above the mean contemporaneously,
sub prime lenders are 25 percent more likely to hold loans in portfolio. In contrast, if this same
increase occurred in the previous year, the lender is 40 percent more likely to sell loans to private conduits.

14 To test for the sensitivity of the results to any potential outliers, all observations with shares ofloans held in portfolio over 0.50 were excluded, and the regressions rerun. The results were found to be consistent with the reported
results. Detailed results are available from the author upon request.
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The results for changes in unemployment rates are not as consistent and may indicate that
the attention paid by subprime lenders and private conduits to labor market conditions may
differ. Although contemporaneous changes in the unemployment rate are insignificant
(almost zero), an increase in the previous year's change in unemployment by one standard
deviation leads to a 28 percent decrease in loans held in portfolio. Assuming that information this old must be known by both parties, this result cannot be driven by asymmetries.
However, a long-run increase in unemployment rates does lead to higher rates of loan retention in portfolio.
Theoretical work (Benjamin, Heuson, and Sirmans 1997) has shown that firms that sell their
loans into the secondary market are more concerned with short-term changes than long-run
cost and benefits. Because most subprime loans are sold, the results also are consistent with
this hypothesis.
Focusing on the contemporaneous results, subprime lenders sell their loans 93.36 percent of
the time. The model predicts that 5.44 percent of subprime loans are held in portfolio, and
94.56 percent are sold.
To highlight some of the most dramatic results, figures 1 and 2 provide a graphical representation of the sensitivity analysis. As shown in figure 1, an increase in change in the unemployment rate from the mean of -0.2 percent to the maximum of 8.4 percent decreases the
share of loans held in portfolio from a mean of 5.4 to 2.1 percent. Consistent with previous
findings (Ambrose and Pennington-Cross 2000), figure 2 shows that as the underserved fraction increases from a mean of27.3 percent to the maximum of 74.2 percent, the share of loans
held in portfolio increases from 5.4 to 35.8 percent. This may be explained partly by the possibility that subprime lenders were positioning themselves for acquisition by depositories during this time, or that it is more difficult to bundle under served loans for sale into the
secondary market. Although equating subprime lending with CRA eligibility is not accurate,
the ability of subprime lenders to deliver high volumes of CRA-eligible loans likely has played
a role in acquisition strategies of depositories since the mid-1990s.
Table 5 shows the standardized marginal estimates for all the variables, and it reinforces the
finding that most of the indicators are economically important in addition to being statistically significant. The magnitude of the location and demographic marginal effects indicates
that there is substantial variation left unexplained by economic effects. Although the causes
ofthese effects are beyond the scope ofthis article, further research is needed to identify why
there are such large regional differences in loan retention rates.

Conclusion
This article provides an exploratory look at the role of subprime lending in the primary and
secondary markets by examining the spatial distribution of FHA-eligible subprime loans. A
list of subprime lenders published by HUD was used, loans were aggregated to the MSA level,
and geographic differences in market shares were modeled as a function oflending standards
and local economic risk factors.
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Figure 1. Contemporaneous Change in the Unemployment Rate and
Loans Held in Portfolio
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Figure 2. Underserved Borrowers and Loans Held in Portfolio
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The empirical results clearly indicate that subprime and FHA market shares are higher in
cities with higher economic risk characteristics. Subprime lending is most active in locations
with weak labor markets (high and increasing unemployment rates) and declining house
prices, whereas FHA lending is most prevalent in locations with poor housing market conditions (declining and volatile house prices). In contrast, prime lenders concentrate their origination activity in markets with lower economic risk.
Subprime lenders sell most of their loans to private conduits. They tend to hold more loans
in portfolio when local economic risks are improving and in locations that have high longterm risk profiles. In essence, subprime lenders are more willing to accept more risk in locations that are improving than in those that are deteriorating. Two potential explanations for
this result are that (1) information asymmetries make it easier to sell higher risk loans in
changing economic conditions, and (2) primary and secondary market participants estimate
the effect of local conditions on the profitability of loans at different rates. In addition,
although the vast majority of subprime loans are sold, the presence of underserved borrowers
makes it more likely that the loans will be held in portfolio.
These results represent the first step in understanding the role of sub prime lending in the
mortgage market. Future research must identify more precisely how households decide to use
subprime lending to purchase a home. This requires knowing borrower reserves, credit history, income, and assets, as well as the extent that this information is verifiable. It is also
important that researchers and market participants gain a better understanding of how subprime loans perform relative to prime mortgages. The private information company MIC has
shown that subprime loans are seriously delinquent (90 days or more delinquent or in foreclosure) at least 10 times more often than prime mortgages, and they are prepaid at least
twice as fast as prime mortgages (MIC 2000), but very little is known about how these mortgages will perform in changing economic environments. For subprime lending and the securitization of subprime loans to become part of the mainstream mortgage market, it is vital
that the details of how subprime loans perform be better understood.

References
Ambrose, Brent, and Charles Capone. 1998. Modeling the Conditional Probability of Foreclosure in the
Context of Single-Family Mortgage Default Resolutions. Real Estate Economics 26(3):391-429.
Ambrose, Brent, and Anthony Pennington-Cross. 2000. Local Economic Risk Factors and the Primary
and Secondary Mortgage Market. Regional Science and Urban Economics 30(6):683-702.
Benjamin, John, Andrea Heuson, and Clemon F Sirmans. 1997. Pricing Effects of the Decision To Sell
or Hold Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loans in a Portfolio. Financial Review 32(1):1-20.
Brueckner, Jan, and James Follain. 1988. The Rise and Fall of the ARM: An Econometric Analysis of
Mortgage Choice. Review of Economics and Statistics 70(1):93-102.
Bunce, Harold, and Randall Scheessele. 1996. The GSEs Funding of Affordable Loans. Housing Finance
Working Paper, Series No. HF-OOl. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research.

Fannie Mae Foundation

Subprime Lending in the Primary and Secondary Markets

49

Canner, Glenn, and Stuart Gabriel. 1992. Market Segmentation and Lender Specialization in the Primary and Secondary Mortgage Markets. Housing Policy Debate 3(2):241-332.
Capone, Charles, and Donald Cunningham. 1992. Estimating the Marginal Contribution of AdjustableRate Mortgage Selection to Termination Probabilities in a Nested Model. Journal of Real Estate Finance
and Economics 5(4):333-56.
Capozza, Dennis, Dick Kazarian, and Thomas Thomson. 1997. Mortgage Default in Local Markets. Real
Estate Economics 25(4):631-56.
Deng, Young Heng, and Charles Calhoun. 1997. A Dynamic Analysis of Adjustable- and Fixed-Rate
Mortgage Termination. Presented at the Allied Social Science Association (American Real Estate and
Urban Economics Association) annual meeting, New Orleans, LA. January.
Dhillon, Upinder, James Shilling, and Clemon F Sirmans. 1990. The Mortgage Maturity Decision: The
Choice between 15-Year and 30-Year FRMs. Southern Economic Journal 56(4):1103-16.
Gabriel, Stuart, and Stuart Rosenthal. 1991. Credit Rationing, Race, and the Mortgage Market. Journal of Urban Economics 29(3):371-79.
Gilkeson, James H., Paul Jacob, and Stephen D. Smith. 1994. Buy, Sell, or Hold? Valuing Cash Flows
from Mortgage Lending. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review 79(6):1-16.
Goodman, John, and Joseph Nichols. 1997. Does FHA Increase Home Ownership or Just Accelerate It?
Journal of Housing Economics 6(2):184-202.
Greene, William. 1990. Econometric Analysis. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Hendershott, Patric, William LaFayette, and Donald Haurin. 1997. Debt Usage and Mortgage Choice:
The FHA-Conventional Decision. Journal of Urban Economics 41(2):202-17.
Hendershott, Patric, and Kevin Villani. 1980. Secondary Mortgage Markets and the Cost of Mortgage
Funds. Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association 8(1):50-76.
Inside Mortgage Finance. 2001. Mortgage Market Statistical Annual. Vol. II. Bethesda, MD.
Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. 2000. The State of the Nation's Housing 2000.
Graduate School of Design and John F Kennedy School of Government.
Kogler, Bernadette. 1997. MorServ Survey 1997. Washington, DC: KPMG.
Linneman, Peter, and Susan Wachter. 1989. The Impacts of Borrowing Constraints on Homeownership.
Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association 17(4):389-402.
Massey, Douglas, and Nancy Denton. 1988. The Dimensions of Residential Segregation. Social Forces
67:281-315.
Mortgage Information Corporation. 2000. Subprime Mortgage Delinquencies. Market Pulse
(summer/fall):6-7.
Passmore, Wayne, and Roger Sparks. 1996. Putting the Squeeze on the Market for Lemons:
Government-Sponsored Mortgage Securitization. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
13(1):27-44.
Pennington-Cross, Anthony, and Joseph Nichols. 2000. Credit History and the FHA-Conventional
Choice. Real Estate Economics 28(2):307-36.

Journal of Housing Research

50

Anthony Pennington-Cross

Phillips, Richard, and James VanderHoff. 1994. Alternative Mortgage Instruments, Qualification Constraints and the Demand for Housing: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of the American Real Estate and
Urban Economics Association 22(3):95-104.
Sa-Aadu, Jarjisu, and Clemon F. Sirmans. 1995. Differentiated Contracts, Heterogeneous Borrowers,
and the Mortgage Choice Decision. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27(2):498-510.
Steinbach, Gorden. 1998. Making Risk-Based Pricing Work. Mortgage Banking (September): 11-20.
Tucker, Michael. 1989. Adjustable-Rate and Fixed-Rate Mortgage Choice: A Logit Analysis. Journal of
Real Estate Research 4(2):81-91.
Van Order, Robert. 2001. The Structure of the Mortgage Market in the United States: A Model of Dueling Charters. Journal of Housing Research 11(2):233-55.
Weicher, John C. 1997. The Home Equity Lending Industry: Refinancing Mortgages for Borrowers with
Impaired Credit. Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute.

Fannie Mae Foundation

